

Committee: United Nations Peacekeeping Force (UNPK)

Question Of: Addressing the Inefficiency of UN Missions due to an Increasingly Monetized Peacekeeping Force

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INTRODUCTION

Peacekeeping is one of the operational roles of the United Nations Department of Peace Operations. As stated by the UN in the unofficial peacekeeping mandate, UN Peacekeeping assists in conflicted countries' navigation from unrest to peace and stability. The "unique strengths" of the force include "legitimacy, burden sharing, and an ability to deploy troops and police from around the world." UN Peacekeeping's central tenet is that they use integratory measures to collaborate with civilian peacekeepers in executing the UN Security Council and General Assemblies' mandates.

The UN views peacekeeping as one of its most effective tools in foreign conflict mitigation. The three basic principles guiding every UN Peacekeeping mission are: (1) consent of the parties, (2) impartiality, and (3) non-use of force except in self-defence and defence of the mandate. Due to the flexibility of peacekeeping, it has been adapted into various configurations over the course and spread of its previous missions. Presently, 13 active UN Peacekeeping operations are deployed across 3 continents, including missions in Western Sahara, the Central African Republic, Mali, DR Congo, Darfur, Golan, Cyprus, Lebanon, Abyei, Kosovo, South Sudan, India and Pakistan, and the Middle East. In contemporary contexts requiring multidimensional action, peacekeeping is a tool of not only maintaining peace, security, and inducing stability, but also facilitating "the political process, protecting civilians, assisting in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants, supporting the organization of elections, protecting and promoting human rights, and assisting in the rule of law," as directly outlined by the United Nations. Admittedly, peacekeeping does not have a 100% success rate however, due to the volatile nature of the conflict-torn countries missions are deployed to - the world's most politically and physically difficult environments.

In order to ensure that peacekeeping constantly evolves, former Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon established the Independent Panel on UN Peace Operations, a 17 member high-level independent board that would comprehensively assess the current state of UN peacekeeping operations as well as preemptively prepare for future needs. In addition to the General Assembly and the Security Council, peacekeeping brings together the UN Secretariat, troop and police contributors, and host governments and civilians in a uniquely global partnership to uphold international security. Two factors play immensely large roles in maintaining the strength of UN Peacekeeping - the legitimacy of the UN charter, and the continuous provision of resources from contributing members. As of March 2020, 121 countries contribute uniformed personnel to UN Peacekeeping, amounting to 81,370 peacekeepers in total - approximately 69,000 of which are contingent troops, 1,000 experts on mission, 9,000 police, and 2,000 staff officers. For the period between July 2018 - July 2019, approximately \$6.69 billion was approved as resources to finance 12 operational missions, as well as supporting AMISOM and providing support (technology and logistics) to global services centers in Italy, Spain, and a regional center in Uganda.

Peacekeeping throughout its history, but more pertinently today, faces a variety of challenges that impede its ability to fully succeed in effectively executing its efforts. Many countries face issues without immediately viable political resolution, missions often have abstract mandates, the rise of complex threats are continually adding to peacekeeper fatalities, and missions are often under-resourced in such situations. Due to an almost singular focus on democratization of conflict-torn environments, peacekeepers also often fail to implement long-term stability. The top-down approach taken by the UN often creates a gaping divide between peacekeepers and local institutions: the inability to bridge this gap in understanding leads to inadequately trained forces implementing incohesive external philosophies.

The key issue that UN Peacekeeping faces today is that it grows increasingly underfunded and under-resourced as a consequence of negligence of duty by more economically advanced Member States. With LEDCs left to pick up the slack and provide the high volume of troops and ground personnel required by the UN to execute missions, the ineffectiveness of peacekeeping missions stems in part from a force that is simply ill-equipped to assist.

DEFINITION OF KEY TERMS

Peacekeepers

Peacekeepers alternatively known as “Blue Helmets” are military personnel acting under the jurisdiction of the UN with the sole purpose of protecting civilians, preventing global conflicts, strengthening security and maintaining peace (“What We Do”, UN). Peacekeepers are provided by individual countries who are then reimbursed by the UN for providing the soldiers. Peacekeepers are armed however are only allowed to fire upon being shot at.

Monetization

Monetization is the act of creating and receiving revenue for a service and/or goods. A relevant example of this would be how countries have monetized peacekeepers as the UN pays countries a fee per peacekeeper to all countries thus individual countries earn revenue for sending said peacekeepers.

Top-Down Approach

Top Down Approach is the method of tackling a problem from the “bigger picture”. This would attempt to resolve the major issue first and any consequences or minor problems later. With regards to peacekeeping, the UN currently employs a top-down approach which focuses on solving the issues in crisis situations by starting with high-ranking government officials and letting the changes filter down to the grassroots.

Bottom-Up Approach

Polar to a Top-Down Approach, A Bottom-Up Approach is the method of tackling the bigger issue through the smaller problems first eventually tackling the major problem at hand. This is the method that the UN should use to achieve better results on peacekeeping missions: begin by solving conflicts that occur between smaller communities and then build up to the government when there is local stability.

Peacekeeping Mandate

Peacekeeping Mandates are official orders/commissions authorized by the United Nations Security Council to the United Nations Peacekeeping Force to carry out an operation. As per the

UN website, the mandates could ask peacekeepers to: Deploy to prevent the outbreak of conflict or the spill-over of conflict across borders; Stabilize conflict situations after a ceasefire, to create an environment for the parties to reach a lasting peace agreement; Assist in implementing comprehensive peace agreements; and Lead states or territories through a transition to stable government, based on democratic principles, good governance, and economic development.

KEY ISSUES

Funding of UN Peacekeeping

In accord with Article 17 of the Charter of the United Nations, each Member State is legally obligated to contribute their proportionate share towards peacekeeping. This share of peacekeeping expenses is apportioned by the General Assembly based on special criterion and assessments under a formula developed and established by Member States. Among the considerations is an account of the relative economic wealth of Member States, with the special global responsibility of the Permanent Five members of the UN Security Council creating larger individual shares. These general principles that underlie the financing of peacekeeping in resolution A/RES/55/235 (23 December 2000). As aforementioned, the 2019-2020 budget for UN Peacekeeping operations was \$6.5 billion. In comparison to the total world military expenditures, estimated at \$1,747 billion in 2013, peacekeeping has less than 0.5% of the operational budget. The 2019-2020 budget is further reduced by 1.9% of the approved 2018-2019 budget. In order of contribution, the largest assessed contributions to UN peacekeeping come from the United States, China, Japan, Germany, United Kingdom, France, Italy, the Russian Federation, Canada, and the Republic of Korea. Various other nations have also made voluntary and non-reimbursable resource contributions to the peacekeeping efforts in the form of “transportation, supplies, personnel, and financial contributions above and beyond their assessed share of peacekeeping costs.”

The operational budget is based on the mission mandate issued by the Security Council, outlined in strategic documents that align resources with the required operations to achieve the overall mission objectives - these all account for costs such as transport, logistics, and staff costs (i.e. salaries). The budget cycle itself, running from 1 July to 30 June of the following fiscal year rarely aligns with the Security Council Mandate. The Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ) reviews the submitted budget proposal from the UNSC and

submits it to the UNGA5 for review and approval. Annual performance reports submitted by each peacekeeping operation are reviewed by the General Assembly for performance and resource use evaluation.

Since the UN has no military forces of its own, each Member State provides the required military and police personnel required for each peacekeeping operation on a voluntary basis. These peacekeepers are paid by their respective Governments with respect to their national rank and salary scale. While civilian personnel and police are paid from the peacekeeping budget, countries that volunteer uniformed personnel to peacekeeping operations are reimbursed at a standard approved rate of \$1,428 USD per soldier by the UN (as of July 2019). Contributing Member States are also reimbursed by the UN for equipment, personnel, and support services provided to the military or police contingents. The issue here lies in the fact that this reimbursement is highly attractive to developing nations that would greatly benefit from UN financial support in return for volunteering the troops. On the other hand, most developed nations gain no added value from UN support and thus refuse to volunteer their troops for peacekeeping missions.

Changing role of UN Peacekeeping

After the end of the Cold War, UN Peacekeeping's strategic context changed immensely. Though they were originally limited to maintaining Cold War ceasefires and stabilizing ground situations through monitoring and reporting, they were suddenly transformed into 'multidimensional enterprises' required to implement peace agreements and lay their foundations for a sustainable future. From human rights monitoring, security reform, demobilization and reintegration of combatants, and building sustainable government institutions, UN Peacekeepers were tasked with complex demands. Their force now had to include administrators, economists, police officers, legal experts, de-miners, electoral observers, human rights monitors, civil affairs specialists, humanitarian workers, and communications experts - alongside the traditional armed troops.

In the mid 1990s, the UN Security Council failed in being able to provide UN Peacekeeping with robust mandates. With inadequate resources, three high-profile operations in the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Somalia were met with underwhelming performance, eventually going under investigation. By the late 1990s, peacekeeping had changed again. Starting with the administration tasks required in Kosovo and East Timor, increasingly complex operations were

deployed, causing UN Peacekeeping to be overextended. They were required to deliver larger and more expensive operations, design and execute transition strategies in relatively still-volatile regions, and prepare for uncertain futures.

Peacekeeping today is multidimensional: peacekeepers must not only “facilitate the political process,” but also “assist in the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of former combatants, support the organization of elections, protect and promote human rights, and assist in the restoring of the rule of law.” New conflicts that spread beyond local/regional boundaries are stretching the UN’s ability to meet the demand of field missions. Increasing political complexity and civilian complications that peacekeeping operations face remains broad. Specialization, including a highly trained police force, will be soon in high demand.

The Top-Down UN Approach

Though the blame exhaustingly falls on UN peacekeepers being underfunded, the top-down approach administered by all intergovernmental bodies involved in peacekeeping is equally at fault. Though the UN claims it has ended numerous armed conflicts and established peace in war-torn countries - and this is fractionally true - in many cases UN Peacekeepers often watch from the sidelines as war continues to rage, unable to intervene. In other cases, peacekeepers implement superficial and surface changes that aren’t deeply rooted enough to hold the peace indefinitely. Thus while being underfunded is part of the reason for this failure, perhaps the larger reason is that the UN doesn’t truly understand, or is unable to address the concept of what is necessary to foster a sustained peace. The strategy employed by the Security Council and executed by other UN committees involve endless efforts to strike deals with local elites or individuals in power, fixating on facilitating ‘fair and free’ elections. What this often fails to acknowledge is the highly necessary bottom-up approach: spending time training with, studying, understanding, and devising strategies with local communities and policy strategists to build a plan for the future based on the people’s idea of how peace should be promoted and upheld. This leads to a general distrust and animosity between peacekeepers and civilians, in many instances having led to outright mockery of the troops - notably on the UN missions in Salvador, Cypriot, and Bosnia. Especially when the UN functions to support the host government, rebel groups often feel elevated hostility at the UN aiding the perceived ‘enemy’.

Countries' Vested Interests

While it must be acknowledged that peacekeeping is one of the hardest roles to execute under the UN - militias, armies, rampant corruption, and poor infrastructure constantly standing in the way of progress - one of its greatest struggles comes from a place of power. Great powers tend to care minutely about the crisis situations in which UN peacekeepers intervene, leading to an insufficient amount of resources volunteered to meet highly ambitious mandates. With their mere budget of only 0.5% of global military spending, UN Peacekeeping is expected to de-escalate almost 25% of ongoing global conflicts.

Due to individual country provision of troops and forces, the UN missions are often understaffed, leading to an inadequate number of soldiers to cover the ground. Most Member States are unwilling to risk the lives of their own military personnel and troops in increasingly dangerous conflicts in which they themselves have no stake or nothing to gain. This leads to months of fruitless efforts by the UN to gather the necessary forces needed to deploy a mission, often resulting in the recruitment of poorly trained and sparingly paid soldiers from developing countries. In 2018, the top personnel contributors to the physical peacekeeping force were Bangladesh, Ethiopia, and Rwanda - all without advanced equipment like helicopters or appropriate vehicles.

Moreover, commanders in the UN peacekeeping forces report to both the UN leadership and their country's chain of command, knowing that it is expected of them to ensure their country's troop's safety. In situations where commanders are faced with the choice between upholding the UN mandate and bringing their soldiers home safely, the UN's mission objectives often take a backseat.

Small Countries making Large Contributions

It is often the developing countries that contribute most to the UN military and police personnel. Though the west 'foots the bill', they are unwilling to send their troops into high risk areas, relying on countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America to provide the manpower. The Global South contributes considerably to UN Peacekeeping missions for three reasons: "regional cooperation; recognition and prestige; and financial benefits." These developing countries hope that standing by the UN in their times of need will be rewarded with a more insider view and role in future UN policymaking. The reason that this disproportionately impacts countries with weaker economies is that the UN reimbursement for any support volunteered, especially troops, is

rewarded with comparatively attractive compensation. However, despite their involvement in UN Peacekeeping, troops from LEDCs have often received lower intensity training, and are equipped with low-quality resources. By no fault of the volunteering Member States, this results in an overall lower impact UN Peacekeeping Mission due to the inability of the soldiers to meet the mission mandate. As of June 2020, Ethiopia has contributed the greatest sum total of troops (6,638), followed by Bangladesh (6,426), and Rwanda (6, 321). In comparison, the sum total number of troops volunteered by America has been 27 personnel, 69 from the Russian Federation, and 262 from the U.K.

MAJOR PARTIES INVOLVED

United Nations Security Council

Being responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security, the Security Council provides mandates for the deployment of UN peace operations since peacekeeping has evolved into a key tool of the UN to maintain said security. Though the peacekeeping mandates have evolved drastically since the founding of UN Peacekeeping, they all stem from the same central tenets surrounding conflict resolution and facilitation of a lasting peace. Based on the situation, it is the duty of the Security Council to assess each conflict's unique aspects and tailor the mission mandate to best help that country recover from a period of crisis. Unfortunately, the two key errors with the way the UNSC is issuing mandates is that they overstretch peacekeepers and are perhaps not individualized enough to the situation. This means that peacekeepers are both under-equipped and realistically unable to mitigate crisis situations in the countries to which they are deployed.

Developing Countries - Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Rwanda

With the current shape that UN peacekeeping is taking, developing countries such as Bangladesh, Ethiopia and Rwanda are increasingly lifting the burden to provide an incredibly understaffed UN Peacekeeping Force with the necessary ground support needed to execute their missions. These countries are attracted to the reimbursement provided by the UN for volunteering members of their military, which in turn also boosts the local economy by means of currency flows. Developing countries also hope that by continuing to provide the support desperately needed by the UN, they will be rewarded in the future with a better bargaining

stance on the policies debated and resolved in the future. What this often results in, however, is peacekeepers on missions being under-trained and unable to carry out the complex and ambitious mission mandates.

Developed Countries + Permanent Five

Monetarily, the Member States of the United Nations classified with relatively more developed economies contribute the largest amounts to UN Peacekeeping in terms of pure fiscal amounts. As mentioned earlier, the United States, China, Japan, Germany, the UK, France, Italy, Russia, Canada, and South Korea all contribute the largest amount of money to UN Peacekeeping Operations. The United States, providing 27.89% of the financing, is followed by China at 15.21%, disproportionately increasing Asia's contribution to UN Peacekeeping as a continent. The other countries include the rest of the Security Council permanent five members, as well as the world's leading economies.

However, it is also the duty of these states to provide an adequate amount of ground support in the form of troops and non-reimbursable resources such as transport. Unfortunately, these nations have notoriously bad track records for providing troops and police personnel to UN peacekeeping missions. Thus, their strategy of providing only fiscal support is seen as nothing more than 'throwing money at the issue'. While they cannot be blamed for being unwilling to provide precious and highly-trained military personnel to conflict zones in which the outcome does not benefit them, their membership to an intergovernmental organization that branches over the global political sphere comes with the responsibility to assume the duties tasked to them as leaders of the contemporary world.

TIMELINE OF EVENTS

Date/Year	Event	Impact
1948	Security Council authorizes deployment of	The mission to monitor an Armistice Agreement in the Middle East (UNTSO) marked the start of UN

	UN military observers to the Middle East	Peacekeeping. Since then, 70 more peacekeeping operations have been deployed by the UN.
1956	First UN Emergency Force deployed successfully	Earliest armed peacekeeping operation deployed to address the Suez Crisis. Before this, peacekeeping was limited to maintaining ceasefires and stabilizing ground situations in the height of the Cold War.
1960	UN Operation in the Congo launched	The first large-scale mission with nearly 20,000 military personnel involved at its peak. Impactful in demonstrating the risks with peacekeeping in war-torn districts. 250 UN personnel, including the Secretary-General, died on the mission.
1988	UN Peacekeepers awarded the Nobel Peace Prize	Nobel Committee states that the contributions of UN Peacekeeping Forces are fundamental to the mandate of the UN, increasing the role of the UN in world affairs.
1989	End of the Cold War marks a rapid rise in peacekeeping operations	The nature of UN Peacekeeping changes, now including intra-State conflict and civil war. Peacekeepers are required to undertake a variety of different roles. 20 operations were authorized between 1989 and 1994.
December 1992	UMOSOM	The United Nations Peacekeeping Mission in Somalia designed to help mitigate the civil war and famine was viewed as an immense shortcoming of the UN, ending with attacks against UN officers and over 500,000 civilian deaths.
1994	Rwandan Genocide	The UNSC commissions an independent inquiry into UN actions during the genocide in light of the inability of UN Peacekeeping to live up to expectations. The Security Council is overall unable to authorize robust

		mandates or provide adequate resources.
1995	Srebrenica Massacre	The mobilization of Bosnian Serbs after the nation gained independence marked the start of an awful mass genocide. Around 8,000 male Muslims were killed by these forces. When refugees fled to the UN safe-zone in Srebrenica, they found the (Dutch) UN troops overwhelmed.
2003 - present	Darfur Conflict in Sudan	Four years after the start of the conflict, the UN deployed 26,000 troops to Darfur. However, they have remained largely unsuccessful in this endeavor. Over the course of the crisis, nearly 200,000 people have died and over 4.4 million people are in need of aid.
May 2010	Peacekeeping on the downturn	UN Peacekeeping enters a phase of consolidation - for the first time in 10 years, peacekeeper forces diminish, starting with the reduction of troops in DR Congo (MONUSCO) and the withdrawal from CAR and Chad (MINURCAT) by the end of 2010.
2013 - present	South Sudan Civil War	Even the deployment of 14,500 UN peacekeepers to South Sudan since the start of the conflict has been ineffective in bringing peace and stability to the region. Instead, 2.5 million people have fled the country, with another 1.8 million displaced within the borders.
October 2014	High Level Independent Panel on UN Peace Operations (HIPPO) established	The UN Secretary-General establishes a 17-member panel to assess the current state of ongoing UN Peace Operations and assess future needs. The HIPPO report, issued in June 2015, outlines key recommendations for the future of peace operations. In September 2015, the Secretary-General issued his

		report on the implementation of the HIPPO recommendations.
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EVALUATION OF PREVIOUS ATTEMPTS TO SOLVE THE ISSUE

2000 Brahimi Report

Named after Lakhdar Brahimi, panel Chair of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations in March 2000, the Brahimi Report calls for three action items with regards to UN Peacekeeping: (1) The renewed political commitment of Member States; (2) Drastic change on the institutional level; (3) Increased financial support.

The Brahimi Report explicitly outlined that the root of all the shortcomings of UN peacekeeping operations was a lack of adequate resource and equipment provision, and that the new changes should provide the missions with achievable and comprehensive mandates. Among the recommendations of the report were: more access to Secretariat briefings and UNSC debates for troop-contributing countries; and the creation of an Electronic Information and Strategic Analysis unit - which was ultimately resisted. The Brahimi Report was successful in establishing the humanitarian aspect of UN peacekeeping, changing its role from purely military to also peacebuilding and developmental. It also changed the future role of UN Peacekeeping from immediate and temporary relief to permanent and long-lasting change.

2009 New Horizon Process

New Horizon was officially initiated in 2009 to “assess the major policy and strategy dilemmas facing UN Peacekeeping,” and to “reinvigorate the ongoing dialogue with stakeholders on possible solutions to better calibrate UN Peacekeeping.” The New Partnership Agenda was the integral document in question, reflecting the debate and agreements between the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support. Key elements of this report were further iterated in the Secretary-General’s report to the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations. Since then, the DPKO and DFS have issued progress reports on action items and the implementation of these initiatives. There was a significant amount of policy that was developed following the New Horizon Initiative, as outlined in the 2010 Progress Report. This was both within the Security Council and throughout the other arms of the UN, all relevant to how peacekeeping needed a better developmental framework and infrastructure.

While the report outlined that many of the New Horizon targets would take time to develop, the significant amount of communication and debate sparked within the UN, and the increased resource allocation to improving the training of peacekeepers, can be seen as an initial success.

2014 High Level Independent Panel on UN Peace Operations (HIPPO)

The 17 member High-level Independent Panel on UN Peace Operations was established in 2014 by former Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon in order to assess UN Peacekeeping and make it fit for the future in the shadow of the Brahimi report's 15th anniversary. The panel was chaired by Jose Ramos-Horta and Ameerah Haq, broadly addressing the spectrum of issues with UN Peacekeeping - from administrative to human rights. Many view the points addressed in the HIPPO report - increased international interconnectedness and a broad peacekeeping mandate change - as volatile to the global situation. Without security in the knowledge that the UN can handle any changes to its role, the Security Council should not jump to redefine the peacekeeping mandate. Additionally, increased cooperation can only come with strong leadership, adequate guidance, and incentivization of the parties. While the role of UN peacekeeping has remained relatively streamlined during the 21st century, the failures continue to mount even after the HIPPO report and extensive debates.

2017 Reform

In 2017, Secretary-General Guterres proposed various reforms to the UN management and development systems, structures, and peace and security architecture. The reform places an emphasis on considering politics at the center of peace operations, aiming to reduce fragmentation and consolidate the focus on peace, security, prevention, and delivery. He established a series of reviews of major peacekeeping operations, focusing the criteria around relevance of mandates, political environment, configuration for the mission, and comparative advantages of key actors.

2018 Action for Peacekeeping (A4P)

Implemented by the Secretary-General in 2018, the A4P initiative calls on the Security Council, in collaboration with Member States, host and contributing countries, regional partners, and financiers to collectively renew their affirmation to engage with UN Peacekeeping and commit to attain excellence. The mutually-agreed upon set of principles and commitments, achieved through formal agreement by the end of 2018, would guide the creation of future peacekeeping

operations. The priorities included focus on politics; women, peace, and security; protection; safety and security; performance and accountability; peacebuilding and sustaining peace; partnerships, and conduct of peacekeepers and peacekeeping operations. In the same year, five 'thematic consultations' took place on the topics of peacebuilding, performance, people, partnerships, and politics that would define how peacekeeping could be strengthened. These measures included, but were not limited to: developing and strengthening the peacekeeping framework, placing emphasis on correcting peacekeeper misconduct, building partnerships between the UN, Member States, and organizations, and emphasizing the need for greater inner-UN cohesiveness for better risk assessment.

POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS

Resources and the Mandate

It is the duty of all Member States of the United Nations, especially those that are more able, to support UN Peacekeeping missions through provision of better funding, more logistical support, and more overall troops and police.

The Security Council, as noted before, must continue to devise peacekeeping mission mandates that are less vague and better interpreted by the organs of the United Nations. These mandates should have realistic aims and feasible ways to be executed.

Above all, Member States should stop pushing their own foreign policy or national interests through the troops volunteered to the UN, and instead of interfering with ground operations, should let commanders report to the UN leadership only. They should be further put pressure on by the other nations to contribute their due amount of troops and resources.

Bottom-Up Approach

The UN should end its top-down approach by stopping its collaboration with national elites to end violence from the top, and stop pushing for elections as a way of potentially holding the peace. Conflict arises in these regions typically over land, water, livestock, traditional power structures, etc. Pushing for a vote before the country is ready/before understandings are made between lower level community groups is useless and can lead to unrest. Furthermore, weak central governments and tensions cannot be solved with elections. Instead train peacekeepers

so they have subject-area experience, teach them local languages and customs, and hire locals instead of sending in foreigners and let them take on leadership roles.

Instead of large expensive conferences to make agreements between governments and rebel leaders that often end in a national vote, the UN should create specialized offices or departments for bottom-up peacekeeping and staff them with experts in analysis and conflict resolution. Ending the one size fits all approach to peacekeeping will enable the UN to tailor the peacekeeping mission to the needs of the country and change the public opinion of peacekeepers as neocolonial thugs.

Revisions to the System

To avoid the problem of an unequal distribution of the responsibilities of volunteering troops to UN Peacekeeping, the UN could revise its system in a way that each Member State is compelled to provide a number of personnel proportionate to their military and fiscal capability. To make this fair, a similar policy can be implemented to the fiscal aspect of volunteering resources so that it reduces the burden on MEDCs and prevents single-form commitment by LEDCs. Like other methods used by the UN, the means through which this can be implemented can take the form of a detailed criteria evaluating each Member State's individual capacity to contribute based on local social, political, and economic factors.

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