

Forum: United Nations Peacekeeping Force

Issue: Evaluating the Effectiveness of Peacekeeping Strategy in Missions Across Africa, Amidst Rising Non-state Actor Presence

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Introduction

Since the start of the UN Peacekeeping Force (1960) in Africa, they have completed 23 missions and there are 7 ongoing missions. The completed missions^I and the ongoing missions^{II} are made at the discretion of the United Nations Security Council. These missions must also follow a specific mandate, one which is created by the UNSC and the mandate can range from observation during times of growing tensions, to assistance to the government of said nations in implementing a peace agreement. However, every UN Peacekeeping Operation is meant to be different, the UNSC will keep a heavy degree of consistency on the type of mandate the peacekeepers are required to do one of the following; “Deploy to prevent the outbreak of conflict or the spillover of conflict across borders; Stabilise conflict situations after a ceasefire which can create an environment for the parties in question to reach a lasting peace agreement; Assist in implementing comprehensive peace agreements; Lead states or territories through a transition to stable government, based on democratic principles, good governance and economic development.”

The UN originally utilised and still does, a formula which will showcase the scale of assessments, and thus, wealthier nations who are based on their shares from the Global Gross National Income, pay a larger fee for the UNPKF than poorer nations. Due to the fiscal reality this recognised, the founders did not want the UN to have a membership which would cause financial troubles.

Groups such as Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (Algerian), Allied Democratic Forces (Uganda and DRC), Islamic State in West Africa (Nigeria, Chad,

Niger, and Cameroon), Lord's Resistance Army (Uganda, South Sudan, CAR, DRC), Al-Shabaab (Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Uganda) are the forefront for many problems of Africa. Out of these groups, all fight due to religion. The notion set up here showcasing how Africa grew out of colonialism. These actors have been present since 1987, with the first NSA being established after a merger between multiple factions. This was the Lord's Resistance Army and this established the need for foreign intervention.

Definition of Key Terms

African Union

A continental union that has 55 members states all located in the continent of Africa. The AU was established due to the change in direction of agenda, moving from post-colonialist times to increased cooperation for economic and social welfare. From this, they laid out the [aims of the AU](#). From the AU General Assembly the creation of the Economical, Social and Cultural Council, African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights, AU Commission on International Law, AU Advisory Board on Corruption, African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, the African Central Bank, Investment Bank, and Monetary Fund being their continental economical institutions, the Regional Economic Communities, African Peer Review Mechanism and Peace and Security Council. These formed multiple bases for the AU and are now working to achieve its main goal, Agenda 2063. Currently, it's biggest contributors are Egypt, South Sudan, Nigeria, Morocco, and Algeria. Furthermore, their major current issues are the following; AIDS in Africa, Corruption, Libya, Military, Regional Conflicts, and Peacekeeping.

Ceasefire

An agreement between both sides of a war to temporarily stop all aggressive actions.

Darfur Line

A term that discusses the fact of when the host party's government agrees to the mission but will then force extra and intentional obstacles which will threaten the mission, or hinder its activities. If we are to cross these lines, the mission is far more likely to fail, and therefore, it is quite important for there to be a united front from the UNSC, the AU, and any other mandated party. Coined after the Darfur region in Sudan.

Force Generation

A generation team that refers to the service which provides the following service when in operation. "Will be the main point of contact for troop-contributing countries who are conducting the process of generation and rotation of active military, while supporting the process for UN Military appointments (Captain, General, etc.). Will participate in the equipment negotiation process, actively facilitate memorandum discussion and the closure of memorandums for timely troop deployment; if required it will also make force adjustment which will provide advice on equipment claims by TCCs" This means it will keep track of the active zones and mitigate between nations for disputes on multiple issues, while also assess the capabilities of a contingent group while maintaining a strong background record.

Mandate

An official commission or order to act.

Mediation Expert

A trained unbiased official that assists two parties in their discussion of disputes. Usually, a contingent being deployed into a larger force when in need due to rising tensions from both parties. The UN maintains a small standby team at all times and this was established by the Department of Political Affairs.

MONUC

A UN mission tasked to bring peace and security in the DRC by supervising the implementation of the ceasefire agreement and disengagement of forces. The mandate for MONUC which the UNSC laid out in February 2000 consisted of [9 different tasks](#) to complete and facilitate their true support.

MONUSCO

An updated mandate of MONUC in which peacekeeping forces are authorized to use all the necessary means required to carry out the mandate and other things such as protection of civilians. The mandate gets set out in resolution [1925](#) with there being 15 159 active personnel (peacekeeping.un.org, 07/20). The country with the most troop contributor is Pakistan with India 88 troops away. The funding for the year of 19-20 was approved by a separate account by the Fifth General Assembly, with the approved budget being \$1 086 018 600.

Non-governmental Organisation

Organizations independent of any government involvement.

United Universal Declaration of Human Rights

A non-binding treaty outlining basic human rights. The [UDHR](#) is also the base for many conventions.

Key Issues

Lack of Strategy

These operations the UNSC creates are instruments but they are formed through different strategies, which are susceptible to failure. Peace operations must require an effective political strategy, but not a substitute for them. Without a required viable strategy, peace operations cannot be the automatic response to all wars, and we need to ensure and engrave in our minds that peacekeepers are unable to do everything and go everywhere. This must be shown in our ideology and that we need to ensure that it is either tactical to deploy peace operations in active war zones while they are part of a process for managing and ensuring true resolve into the conflict, or not releasing Peacekeepers into active war zones (UNMIS, MONUC, UNISOM, etc.). The belief then is that there must be military intervention instead of a peacekeeping operation when there is a “systematic massacre” against civilians by the government.

Strategic Coordination

Missions in Africa are partly due to there being multiple active war zones and unless we can ensure they are a viable process for managing conflict. A multitude of actors are part of the parties in these missions (states, international organisations, non-governmental [organisations](#), etc.)

Ineffective usage of mandate

Considering that peace operations are less likely to succeed if the given resources are not enough, and if the [mandate](#) does not form a strong base towards the operation, the mission is bound to fail from the start. Taking the examples of the gruelling task of the [AMISOM](#), having to protect a transitional government that was recognised, but was unpopular in Somalia. Or with the example of [MONUSCO](#), which was to assist the Congolese government and the security force while protecting civilians, but also having to fight against the Non State Actors, which added to their task, thus leading to the first and only time the UN used force with the right to neutralise and disarm the NSA, which in this case was the M23 Militia Group.

Inefficiency of the Peacekeepers in Africa

An important part of the definition of a peacekeeping mission is to define what they are to do. However, the [UNSC](#) has failed to create an effective purpose for their failed operations. There needs to be a wider consensus on the tasks that the Peacekeepers are meant to do and be able to deliver peace.

Differences of definitions in UN and AU

The UN believes that their peacekeeping operations will be far more successful in their operation if they consider and maintain, successfully, the following conditions; a peace to keep (a signing, [ceasefire](#), peace agreement, etc.); positive regional engagement (all parties of the dispute are happy to implement proper and true change); a consensus/full backing of the UNSC; A clear yet achievable [mandate](#) with required resources which will match the [mandate](#).

Thus the UN creates three different core principles to ensure smooth and successful operations. They are the following; “consent from all parties; impartiality and objectivity; no use of force except in self defense and defense of the [mandate](#)” (africacenter.org, 31/07/2013)

The UN might have formulated their ideology, which they consider correct, or at the very least the most opportunistic considering ceteris paribus, however the African Union has a different ideology which they use. It argues there must be a peace support operation which is able to address the entirety of the conflict and management of challenges, therefore criticising the UN’s ideology for peacekeeping and the AU’s ideology is one that helps more so in Somalia, DRC and Mali. The AU developed a different peacekeeping “doctrine”. They consider it worse to wait for the peace to keep, and therefore the AU considers it better to establish peace before keeping it.

Lower utilisation of Peace Operations to support Effective Peace Processes

The difficulty in constructing an effective operation during an unstable environment (like that of Sudan, Somalia, the DRC, Côte d’Ivoire, etc.) have showcased this point to a great extent. When we are able to organise understanding of effective processes for peace, and encourage lower budgetary expenditure, but use seasoned professionals in these operations to ensure mediation. Dubbed [mediation experts](#), the UN possesses a small team of them on standby, while the AU does not even contain a single mediation body. Due to this strategy, the UN has had failures where it went from monitoring to protecting and peacekeeping in a rushed, yet incoherent manner, botching the entire operation. This does not mean lowering their peace operation amount, rather their standards of when to intervene

Use of better and more effective Entry and Exit Strategies

Once the UN understands the timing of leaves, their peacekeeping will become more effective. Likewise for when to enter. The UN has a history of slowing themselves down, and deliberating many times on what to do, only for them to lose time, and with certain cases, the deliberation only leads to the

failure of the Peace operation. An example of such can be that of the Rwandan Mission. This mission was not one of success and could have been executed in a more effective manner, had the UN understood the actions and acted upon them sooner.

There must be understanding on what the consent being given is, if there is no consent then the mission is bound to fail more often than not. Therefore, the UN needs to look at whether the consent is desirable but not essential and what happens if actors will withdraw their consent and/or place furthermore conditions upon the [mandate](#) after the peacekeepers deploy. They must be able to decide what the role is these operations play in preventing the government of the parties from committing atrocities against their population. An example of lack of consensus, would be the 2011 intervention decision made by the [UNSC](#) on Libya. This caused mass disagreements in the AU and with the AU, and due to there being a lack of consensus, it complicated the exit strategy, and they failed to assess the performance of the operation. Furthermore, it is very important for these operations to retain rebuilding of services in a country and to maintain that in their [mandate](#) so as to help strengthen the authority of the state in the case of an armed Non State Actor.

[Use of better resources](#)

If a peace operation is to fail, especially by the UN, it will damage the reputation the UN has tried to build, take into account the failure of the Rwandan mission, and moreover, it will damage the country politically, economically or socially. Due to there not being better international effort being expended to an operation (an example being the United States being late on their payments to the Fifth General Assembly upon Peacekeeping by three months, or there being lower Troop or Police Contributing Countries, moving from 85% of the UNSC to roughly 40% for a majority of the UNSC in 2018), it will also need to ensure that there is better allocation of resources which will better the mission as a whole. Some agendas that need to be taken care of are; personnel, asset, finances, headquarters, etc. If there is a

shortcoming in personnel they will have to work with a smaller number, which will only further hinder the brand as a whole. There has not been exposure to countries with a strong military capacity for [force generation](#) and if they are able to apply this to the AU then there will be a more strategic and successful operation every time for the organisation in question. With relation to financial integrity, there must be assurance they retain effectiveness while being successful. When these peace operations are carried out in more inhospitable and hostile environments that may be remote, they will need to carry out more tasks on that. They will need to make sure when these operations happen they are carried out to their maximum efficiency so as to make them cost effective.

Abuse of Power by UN Peacekeepers

Killings, torture, sexual violence, all against civilians, have been documented on multiple accounts across Africa with this being very prominent in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The UN has provided tools to combat these sexual abuses with UNSC resolutions, and on March 11, the adoption of the first ever resolution on sexual abuses and exploitation, yet hold them accountable did happen, but there must be better information throughout the entire operation. A popular example being the Central African Republic discusses the sexual exploitation by UN peacekeepers, but there is a clear absence of a coordinated response among UN agencies and they need to ensure better accountability of the peacekeepers, especially in hostile regions or regions with newer conflicts.

Non-State Actors

Non State Actors are present across Africa. The Horn of Africa consists of islamic religious terrorism, which can be seen with Al Shabaab, or Boko Haram. Al Shabaab has proven that the issue regarding terrorism is mainly due to the following; other sources of conflict, border disputes, historic grievances, or regional/international involvement. After 2002, international fears diminished as tensions in Somalia calmed. Somalia since 1991 has been in a dictatorship and therefore they led to environmental and social issues such as famine, breaking of

relations, etc. Following 2006 however, Somalia was back on the scene for terrorism as an Islamist group took control of Mogadishu which led to the collapse of the US backed warlords present. This changed the government to a strict Islamic one. Even though the UNSC tried establishing a peace operation (for settlement), the operation failed as the Islamic Court vowed to take “any action necessary for the prevention of injustice.”

Non State Actors have contributed to any conflict, a prominent one being due to Somali factions. Eritrea and Ethiopia have since 2006 been in a proxy war, and over a territorial dispute. This leads to a series of unfortunate events in which it starts to create instability in any region, with two famous examples being the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Central African Republic.

Major Parties Involved and their Views

United States of America

The United States is the biggest single contributor to the monetary aspect of the UNPKF. It also utilises a fluctuation of policies for maintenance of individual peace operation. While the Obama Administration was in power, the US backed the operations and renewal of these operations in the Central African Republic and Mali, and during this time they would also be overseeing the closure of operation Liberia and Cote D'Ivoire as these countries stabilised after intervention and resolution of internal conflicts. The newer peace operations that are far more multidimensional and multinational than previous years, prove to be a severe pressure, due to the failure of multiple missions mainly a cause of the inadequate efforts of these Administrations (cdn.cfr.org, 05/15).

They account for not only the labour division, but the monetary division, therefore, when creating and mandating UN Missions which provide different approaches than that of the nations that provide the uniformed personnel. This inconsistency in these work divisions, has therefore urged the troop contributing countries to broaden their effect on mission creation. Alongside this, the US has also been criticised for creating contemporary and multidimensional, yet filled with drawbacks, missions. This has led to them not being able to let the field ops have clear lines and definitions between peacekeeping, stabilization, counterinsurgency,

counterterrorism, atrocity (war crime) prevention or state building. Alongside this, the Peacekeepers are not trained in the ways of peace operations unlike army recruits. Due to this, they are not as often equipped or motivated to deal with such challenges and therefore will have to almost always face huge capability gaps in true and successful functioning of the operation.

Due to there being such a growing interest in Africa to foster stability in it, the US should utilise their influence to address these challenges successfully. However, due to the US lacking solidarity, there has been conflict both internally and externally. Due to their internal lack of a strategic approach to configure a policy and to figure its authorities out. The US also has failed to pay its finances to the UN Peacekeeping on time or in full multiple times. The US also faces choices on how they will find effective African security partners and find that balance of civilians and military for a successful operation, which if not done properly will lead to a one sided partnership that will yield a net loss, therefore proving the operation worthless from an economical and realistic standpoint.

The US also does not achieve any value to an effective peace operation because they utilise, in layman's terms, quantity over quality. They have utilised conditionality in which they will use the provision of assistance because the recipient would reform its activities in the future, which gives full control to the recipient, proving to be a fatal mistake. US has also not been able to invest in partners that share the right conflict management objectives which follow the US' national security strategies and ones that are ready to create sustainable peacekeeping institutions for Africa.

The US must also be able to strengthen its support for the multilateral institutions in the area and due to them not doing so it has led them to a stalemate and showcased their inefficiency to the African missions. Due to them not being able to work with the European Union, who has gone on to develop a strong relationship in that area circa. 2003, and the [African Union](#), which plays a larger part in addressing peace and security in the continent, they have not been able to utilise selectiveness rather than conditionality in their missions. Due to this not having been done the UN or the AU have not been able to be selective regarding Troop Contributing Countries as they draw from a regional scale rather than a more global

scale. Considering that the US has not been able to outline a partnership with the AU, it has lost out on providing proper support to AU missions and if they are to help the AU, it will only help them, and not hinder either party in the long run.

African Union

A pattern which has been found in recent missions has been the fact that the AU has started to play the central role, whether it be they authorise deployment in turbulent zones or whether it be their support for pre existing missions. Furthermore, Africa has used partnership peacekeeping rather than conventional one organisation styled peacekeeping.

This proves to be the helping hand they require in successful operations and as we transition from countries in conflict, the ones that can translate responsibilities to other respected parties have provided a far more even ground. However, there are still warnings that come with these patterns. A major problem of the AU is the fact that it still requires assistance from international parties, which is shown by monetary funding coming from international donations. These donations account for $\approx 66.67\%$ of the AU funding, and it;s biggest donor is the EU. The AU also cannot truly deploy average numbers of both police and civilian experts on these missions and therefore it suffers from an outstanding gap in its force leading to an unsuccessful mission. Finally, the fact that these operations in Africa have to see through a range of challenges, be it operational, strategic, or politics, this leaves the AU unable to achieve the mission and due to these ancient problems, it can be shown there is obvious lack of political support.

Due to the fact that the AU lacks political support, it should start to utilise a litmus test with the question, “Does it cross the [Darfur Line?](#)” A reality of the AU is the financial aspect. In it’s 2015 budgetary report, the AU reported the fact that out of \$379 million, only \$8.7 million is paid by the members in AU, while the rest are external partners.

As a closure, the problem of every operation suffering from outstanding gaps in their force is still one they face today. The cannot provide rapid deployment due to their troops already having been spread slim, their capabilities to create a new mission is nigh impossible. Considering that the UN cannot contain these improvised devices,

whether it be for reconnaissance or for an attack, it has to pay a premium for transportation, medical care, intelligence, and communications, leading them to have a hard time irrespective of whether they have more resources than the opposition. Considering the future, there is not a positive outlook, and it will most likely lead to them encountering improvised explosive devices more frequently.

[People's Republic of China](#)

The People's Republic of China has specifically utilised the Peacekeeping Operations to its advantage for Africa. When the US did not invest as much into Africa, China doubled down on their investments, moving from 3% in 2013, to 10.25% of the total UN Peacekeeping budget in 2018 and moving forward, which led to an increase in troops, political strength, and diplomatic and corporate interests. This led to widespread speculation on what the true intention was, by investing in Africa through the PKF. China is being said to, "play the long game" and utilise them by investing in the stability and success of Africa. This can be seen in areas such as the Horn of Africa where they are said to have built a "giant fortress", academically referred to as a naval base in Djibouti, one of the grandest of its kind.

As there have been policy shifts during the past few years, it shows the fostering interest of China. We see that once a country signs the UNPF [mandate](#), they take a more proactive role for what they do, which is better than not taking a role, which up until recently was China's stance, hence the abstentions during voting on new missions. China now participated in the creation of truce supervisions, all the way till the functioning and powers of a transnational council.

[Democratic Republic of Congo \(DRC\)](#)

The DRC is a nation that has been bettered by the UN, with the help of [MONUC](#) and [MONUSCO](#). The UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo ([MONUC](#)) started by [Security Council](#) resolution [1279](#) in 1999 and [1291](#) in 2000. This came into play past the Second Congo War, and was there to maintain peace through monitorization. The UN's presence in DRC was to be observers and reporters on the amount of articles from peace agreements followed by factions. The DRC is also one of the most special cases of the UN. This is due to the fact that this is the only peace operation which was tasked with carrying out neutralisation and

disarmament operations. The subsection Force Intervention Brigade, would go onto engage with the M23 Militia Group. They would go on to make them retreat and do the same with the Allied Democratic Forces. This proves the success of offensive operations more so than peaceful.

Republic of South Sudan

In the case of South Sudan, a full scale, Multi-Year DDR Program (MYDDRP) was launched for the whole of Sudan in June 2009 and was split following South Sudan's independence in 2011. December 2012 marked the end of Phase I of MYDDRP and Phase II was not successful either with the eruption of the civil war in December of 2013 severally weakening the program. However, UNSC [mandated](#) UNMISS to provide support to the government of South Sudan in the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) program and it was agreed that the UNMISS would take responsibility for the disarmament and demobilisation, while the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) would handle the reintegration aspect of DDR.

Federal Republic of Somalia

Due to Al-Shabaab and many local factions, Somalia faces major instability. Al-Shabaab has been part of the "War on Terror", "Somalian War", "Somalian Civil War", and many more middle eastern conflicts, as it pledged allegiance to Al-Qaeda. Al-Shabaab's success has been due to its never ending flow of income being due to natural resource merchantry and it's connections to establish strength at any given time (in 2014 the troop count of Al Shabbab was expected to be around 8000 militants).

During the Transnational Federal Government's reign of peace and he AMISOM mandate, Mogadishu was captured by them with relative success. This occurred in August of 2011.

The reign of Al Shabaab does still exist today, but since 2014, the leader Ahmed Abdi Godane has passed away with the international community hailing this as a success. Nevertheless, Al Shabaab is still responsible for the 2013 Mall attack, 2017 Mogadishu bombings and the 2019 bombing of Mogadishu.

Federal Republic of Nigeria

Nigeria is prominent to one major organisation. The organisation Boko Haram or the Islamic State in West Africa has long been responsible for terrorist-like actions in Nigeria, Chad and the surrounding area. It's more prominent attack is the July Mosques Massacres in Nigerian city Kukawa. Here, there was ineffective usage (and bribery) of local authorities which led to minimal defense on a zone of peace and prosperity. Boko Haram in 2002 was to be peaceful and promote the teachings of Islam. However, it turned violent and in 2015 aligned itself with the Islamic State. Boko Haram has killed tens of thousands of people in Nigeria alone, and due to the ineffective authority in Nigeria, Boko Haram took complete advantage of it and refused to stop until it dimmed down until 2009, where it executed their peaceful leader Mohammed Yusuf.

Development of Issue/Timeline

Date	Event	Outcome
July 1960	Establishment of the United Nations Operation in the Congo	The first UN operation in Africa was as an observer operation. In this the UN established with resolution 143 for the withdrawal of all belgian forces from Congo and the peacekeepers were to provide the government in power with military assistance until the agreement was fulfilled. A successful endeavour for the UN which lasted

		for 4 years.
December 1988	Establishment of the United Nations Angola Verification Mission I	The mission was to withdraw all Cuban troops from Angola and was established by resolution 626 . The troops were to move through and redeploy these troops at a more northern stage. Another successful mission that shaped the department of verification and observation of the UNPKF. The operation lasted for 3 years.
April 1991	Establishment of the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO)	Established with resolution 690 , it indicated observation of the ceasefire between Moroccan Forces and the Frente Polistario and they would organise a vote in which the Western Saharan people would choose between merging with Morocco or becoming a sovereign nation. This mission was also to

		engage in Mine Action Activities, in which they would demine Western Sahara and also implement the UNHCR's Confidence Building Measures Programme.
February 1992	Creation of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations	Since the start of the UN, all peace operations were founded and maintained from the UN Office of Special Political Affairs. Once the Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali came into power, he created the DPKO and in February of 1992 introduced this to the General Assembly. This gave more power to the Secretariat for management of the Peacekeeping operations and therefore provided them with better planning capabilities.
April 1992	Establishment of the UN Operations in Somalia I	Established with resolution 751 , this

		<p>operation was to observe the ceasefire agreement created in Mogadishu and for them to deliver supplies throughout distribution centres across Mogadishu for civilians. This would later be changed and the new mandate would protect “humanitarian convoys” throughout Somalia instead of Mogadishu. UNOSOM would also go on to work with the Unified Task Force and this would be for them to provide humanitarian assistance. The mission lasted for 1 year.</p>
<p>June 1992</p>	<p>Report produced by the United Nations Secretary General on Preventive Diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping</p>	<p>With the invitation of the United Nations Security Council, the UNSG was invited to prepare an analytical report on the strength of the peacekeeping force and recommend solutions to make</p>

		<p>effective the framework of the current Charter for “preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping”. The report was taken into account and therefore started a reformatinal process which was completed in 1995.</p>
June 1993	Establishment the United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR)	<p>Established and implemented with the use of resolution 846 and this was to monitor the Ugandan-Rwandan borders. The Rwandan “turn of events” (genocide) did not allow UNOMUR to ensure the implementation of its full mandate, but it took on its confidence building pillar, and focused on implementing that throughout. The mission lasted 3 years.</p>
	Establishment of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR)	<p>Established with resolution 872, the mission was to</p>

		<p>implement the “Arusha Peace Agreement”. Of course, this failed and thus far the mandate adjusted to ensure a second wave of genocide did not occur and to incurr for the loss of the country’s social value. The mission lasted for 3 years.</p>
November 1994	<p>Establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)</p>	<p>A relatively successful tribunal, the world learned tribunals could only be successful if the host nation was willing to cooperate. The tribunal lasted for 21 years.</p>
March 1998	<p>Establishment of the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA)</p>	<p>Established with resolution 1159, this was to assist the local government in maintaining security and stability and to supervise, control storage, and monitor the disposition of weapons through a DDR program. They were to also provide</p>

		advice for elections, and this mission remained relatively successful in building CAR back up. The mission lasted for 2 years.
November 1999	Establishment of the United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo	Established with resolution 1279 , this was to observe the disengagement of forces and ceasefire , while maintaining communication between all parties of the ceasefire . Later on it would also go on to supervise the implementation of the ceasefire and also go through multiple related tasks. The mission lasted for 11 years.
August 2000	Writing of the Brahimi Report	A report on the shortcomings of the historical peacekeeping mandate making system. This report would also make specific and realistic solutions that would inhibit change. For the

		<p>duration of the UN, the panel came to a consensus on how there must be proper resources and equipments provided to all peace operations for them to be effective, which also work with a clear mandate to achieve long term peace.</p>
March 2005	Writing of the Zeid Report	<p>This report was on implementation of a strategy to eliminate sexual exploitation and abuse in UNPK operations and was the first comprehensive report on accountability of UN peacekeeping personnel. The report contained solutions which were directed at the Secretariat and the Member States.</p>
March 2005	Establishment of the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS)	<p>Established with resolution 1590, they were to implement the Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed by both parties of the</p>

		<p>conflict. They would also be endorsing humanitarian assistance and would promote human rights in its entirety. The mission lasted for</p>
<p>March 2007</p>	<p>Establishment of the Department of Field Support (DFS)</p>	<p>Established with GA resolution 61/256, the Department would be one to sustain, manage and increase the effectiveness of PK operations while pursuing true safety and security for UNPK personnel. The DFS would also improve accountability methods and would also later go on to control logistics of missions as well.</p>
<p>July 2007</p>	<p>Establishment of the African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID)</p>	<p>Established with resolution 1769, UNAMID was there to prompt peacemaking and also support mediation while carrying out protection services to civilians and providing humanitarian</p>

		assistance. The mission is still in practice today.
January 2008	Writing of the Capstone Doctrine	The UNPKO Principles and Guidelines document would be the document to set principles and the core objectives of the UNPK Operations, while understanding the main factors of these operations' success.
March 2008	Promotion of the UN Wide Strategy for Assistance to the Victims of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by UN Personnel	This document is still an important step towards ensuring victims of sexual exploitation would be able to receive appropriate assistance and in a timely manner.
July 2010	Establishment of the United Nations Organisation Stabilisation	Established by resolution 1925 , this mission was a revampment of the MONUC mission. The mission was to ensure protection of civilians, humanitarian aid and any under imminent threat of physical

		violence. The mission would also support the government in stabilisation. The mission is still in practice today.
July 2011	Establishment of United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS)	Established by resolution 1996 , this mission would be to ensure peace, protection and security in the newly established South Sudan, while helping it establish developmental conditions. Later on the mandate would reprioritise the mandate towards humanitarian aid and monitoring of human rights. The mission is still in practice today.

Previous Attempts to Solve the Issue

[Joint United Nations-African Union Framework for Enhancing Partnership on Peace and Security](#)

The framework of the UN and AU wants to implement a holistic and practical approach in making the partnership result oriented, therefore more effective. The framework forces the UN to work in close collaboration immediately following an

indicator of a potential conflict, and to plan conflict prevention in a more effective manner. Therefore, all issues in the UN and the AU peace operations are taken care of with far more accountability than before. These can include topics such as women, peace, security, communication, etc. Thus, they have identified these areas for partnership; increasing understanding of causes for conflicts, prevention, addressing conflict, peace making, reviewing systems for partnerships, and resource mobilisation.

To ensure the best results, we must therefore utilise coordination from offices to fields, and that [mandate](#) creators will need to ensure they follow the right ideologies to ensure a successful mission. We need to consider different organisations who want to maintain their own agendas (UNOMUR where the fight was between parties wanting to establish their own fronts), and so we need to ensure that our political prowess is not to help their agenda, but to help the overall agenda. Due to the instability in Africa, it is easy to redirect our focus unintentionally to a humanitarian but redundant topic. We must also take a look at the focus of many coordination issues. The US and EU are both major aspects and contributors to the peace missions, but the UN is the major operation that will determine the brains of the operation, yet there must be mutual respect for the [African Union's](#) authority, albeit political. They must ensure that their estimations are correct in the capabilities of the AU.

[Redefinition of the UN Peace and Security Pillar](#)

Part of the [UN Charter](#), that various member states are committed to upholding, is saving the future generations from the undoubtedly horrific effects of war. This part is known as the UN Peace and Security Pillar. Unfortunately, it has been seven decades since the founding of the UN, yet this goal seems to remain urgent and very relevant to this day. That begged the question, is it time to bring change to the UN Peace and Security Pillar to lead the world into peace?

Conflicts that take place in today's age not only bring intense suffering but also are becoming increasingly complex and difficult to resolve. Furthermore, there has been a surge in the number violent conflicts along with the number of casualties. This has also led to massive displacement, human right violations and humanitarian

needs which without being addressed would put the completion of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) at risk.

This rapidly changing world called for a change and the Secretary General decided to restructure the peace and security pillar with the plan to make it more articulate, effective and better suited for collaboration with actors outside the UN. Within this pillar, the Department of Peace Operations (DPO) and Departments of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA) fortunately share common goals; to prevent violent conflict and to deeply etch the concept of peace into the core values of society. The restructuring has brought two major changes which are as follows:

Firstly, there is a heavier emphasis on conflict prevention that is effective and the sustenance of peace. This paired with the variety of partners and an effective early warning system, the pillar is not only able to accurately and quickly identify any risk of an escalation or outbreak of conflict but also respond to them in the correct manner.

Secondly, the pillar is more unified as the reformation has created a single operational structure that can be used by all, furthermore, these peace operations can be guided by a more regional approach with the full access to UN resources. This creates a better field presence that is more effective and systematic.

In conclusion, the reformation of the pillar has allowed an alignment of the multiple goals of the UN regarding human rights, development, peace and security and has created a more effective approach to outbreaks and escalations in conflict.

Counter-Instability Measures by the African Union

There is an old initiative by the OAU, called the African Peace and Security Architecture, in which they provide support to required nations with instability. The APSA includes the 3 pillars which are conflict prevention, conflict management and peace building. In all of these the APSA is effective, but when it comes to funding, which it lacks nationally, it cannot keep up with the amount of operations that come in every so often, whether it be for NSA actions, ceasefire mandate, etc., the APSA spreads far too thin. Due to this, the AU is not effectively able to combat instability which is due to multiple reasons, it becomes dilatory.

Possible Solutions

Effective Mandate for UN Led Operations

Specific Mission capabilities are a must to ensure that we are successful in creating an effective [mandate](#). This means that the creation of a [mandate](#) by the UNSC outlines each aspect, and if any outstanding event comes into play, the UNSC is quick to react to it and ensure successful changes to the [mandate](#) which ensure success due to communication.

There needs to be mention of a clear mediation team as well, one that is permanently based in Africa as this will have a better, more positive impact than the envoys that attend only when there is a true conflict, and are not based in the relationships of these nations. How realistic and holistic this will be long term, must be determined via the committee.

Ensuring transparency between the Field and the Office

Accountability, one of the most important aspects to ensure success in each operation can only be maintained if there is transparency between field and office. This can be done by recruiting rapporteurs specific to each mission who report through their own discretion, but this could also lead to more harmful impacts than positive ones.

Necessities Towards All Operations

The UN has believed in efficiency and success, especially towards its peacekeeping operations (examples such as UNAVM1, UNTAG, etc.). This has led them to leave out details required for all operations. Examples are as follows; resource management (their changes in each mission is welcomed, but at times they forget to mitigate the most effective resources Troop Producing Countries can provide, peacekeepers), mutual understanding for prosperity (understanding the use of the Darfur Line and how we need to better ourselves to provide sufficient help to other nations, especially with nations such as Somalia), cooperation between all

parties (the inclusion of all parties in the state of conflict which can include local law enforcement parties or other non governmental organisations maintaining peace prior to UN enforcement, etc.) and many more.

In these necessities, there must also be discussion of how effective the C-34 committee manages communication between TCCs and the field. In previous situations, the C-34 has tried to its best abilities to enforce near strict regulations in which they use effective communication but often falls behind due to the high maintenance required on this. Due to this, the C-34 has not been able to successfully and effectively find communication methods, therefore suggesting for better mandate detailing the need for peacekeepers, how these troops will be utilised to their maximum efficiency, how these troops may be able to progress in the UN through detailed timekeeping, etc.

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Appendix

1. United Nations Operation in the Congo (1960-1964), United Nations Angola Verification Mission I (1988-1991), United Nations Transition Assistance

Group (1989-1990), United Nations Angola Verification Mission II (1991-1995), United Nations Operation Mozambique (1992-1994), United Nations Operation in Somalia I (1992-1993), United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (1993-1997), United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (1993-1996), United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (1993-1996), United Nations Operation in Somalia II (1993-1995), United Nations Aouzou Strip Observer Group (1994), United Nations ANgola Verification Mission III (1995-1997), United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (1997-1999), United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (1998-1999), United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (1999-2005), United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (2000-2008), United Nations Operation in Burundi (2004-2007), United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (1999-2010), United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (2007-2010), United Nations Mission in the Sudan (2005-2011), United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (2004-2017), United Nations Mission in Liberia (2003-2018)

2. United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (1991), United Nations/African Union Mission Darfur (2007), United Nations Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (2010), United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (2011), United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (2011), Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (1 July 2013), United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in the Central African Republic (2014)
3. They were to monitor the Ceasefire Agreement's implementation and if caught, investigate violations against the agreement, they were to establish continuous communication with headquarters of all forces, to develop an action plan within 45 days of adoption of resolution 1291 which would implement the ceasefire in all forms of support and there to be orderly withdrawal of troops after successful completion, they were to negotiate with both parties for the "release of prisoners of war, military captives and remains in cooperation with international agencies", to see through the disengagement of forces, to monitor compliance of the ceasefire with regards to weapon related items, to provide technical support to UN agencies in the region, to

deploy mine action experts who would assess unexploded regions and develop action plans for the removal of mines and other unexploded ordinances.